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Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability 
of Rigid Designation 
The issues I shall consider in this paper are central to my current research, and 
their centrality is a source of present difficulty. In the book on which I am at work, 
these issues arise only after lengthy prior discussion has led to conclusions I must 
here present as premises. Limited illustration and evidence for those premises 
will follow, but only in the later portions of this paper, where they are put to 
work. 
What I am presupposing will be suggested by the following claim: To under-
stand some body of past scientific belief, the historian must acquire a lexicon that 
here and there differs systematically from the one current in his or her own day. 
Only by using that older lexicon can historians accurately render certain of the 
statements that are basic to the science under scrutiny. Those statements are not 
accessible by means of a translation that uses the current lexicon, not even if it 
is expanded by the addition of selected terms from its predecessor. 
I shall elaborate that claim in the first of the three sections of this paper and 
illustrate it in the second by an extended analysis of some interrelated terms from 
the vocabulary of Newtonian mechanics. The final section will apply what I have 
said to some standard assertions about meaning and/or reference made by propo-
nents of causal theory. Scientific development, I shall then suggest, has from time 
to time involved sets of scientific terms in systematically interrelated acts of 
redubbing. Only for the periods between those acts, I shall argue, does dubbing 
result in rigid designation. That sketch supplies the route on which I now 
embark. 1 
This paper is a somewhat reduced and considerably revised version of a draft, "Possible Worlds 
in History of Science," prepared for discussion at a Nobel Symposium held in August 1986. That 
fuller version, also much revised, has since been published in: Sture Allen, Possible Worlds in Hu-
manities, Arts, and Sciences (Berlin: 1988). The abridged form was prepared for the annual Chapel 
Hill Philosophy Colloquium in October 1986. Both versions, in their published forms, owe much to 
the cogent criticism and advice of Barbara Partee, as well as to that of my colleagues Ned Block, Syl-
vain Bromberger, Dick Cartwright, Jim Higginbotham, Paul Horwich, and Judy Thomson. 
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* 
A historian reading an out-of-date scientific text characteristically encounters 
passages that make no sense. That is an experience I have had repeatedly whether 
my subject was an Aristotle, a Newton, a Volta, a Bohr, or a Planck. 2 It has been 
standard to ignore such passages or to dismiss them as the products of error, igno-
rance, or superstition, and that response is occasionally appropriate. More often, 
however, sympathetic contemplation of the troublesome passages results in a 
different diagnosis. The apparent textual anomalies are artifacts, products of mis-
reading. 
For lack of an alternative, the historian has been understanding words and 
phrases in the text as he or she would if they had occurred in contemporary dis-
course. Through much of the text that way of reading proceeds without difficulty; 
most terms in the historian's vocabulary are still used as they were by the author 
of the text. But some sets of interrelated terms are not, and it is failure to isolate 
those terms and to discover how they were used that has permitted the passages 
in question to seem anomalous. Apparent anomaly is thus ordinarily evidence of 
the need for local adjustment of the lexicon, and it often provides clues to the na-
ture of that adjustment as well. An important clue to problems in reading Aris-
totle's physics is provided by the discovery that the term translated 'motion' in his 
text refers not simply to change of position but to all changes characterized by 
two end points. Similar difficulties in reading Planck's early papers begin to dis-
solve with the discovery that, for Planck before 1907, 'the energy element hv' re-
ferred, not to a physically indivisible atom of energy (later to be called 'the energy 
quantum'), but to a mental subdivision of the energy continuum, any point on 
which could be physically occupied. 
These examples all turn out to involve more than mere changes in the use of 
terms, thus illustrating what I had in mind years ago when speaking of the "incom-
mensurability" of successive scientific theories. 3 In its original mathematical use 
'incommensurability' meant "no common measure," for example of the hypote-
nuse and side of an isosceles right triangle. Applied to a pair of theories in the 
same historical line, the term meant that there was no common language into 
which both could be fully translated. 4 Some statements constitutive of the older 
theory could not be stated in any language adequate to express its successor and 
vice versa. 
Incommensurability thus equals untranslatability, but what incommensurabil-
ity bars is not quite the activity of professional translators. Rather, it is a quasi-
mechanical activity governed in full by a manual that specifies, as a function of 
context, which string in one language may, salva veritate, be substituted for a 
given string in the other. Translation of that sort is Quinean, and the point at 
which I aim will be suggested by the remark that most or all of Quine's arguments 
for the indeterminacy of translation can with equal force be directed to an oppo-
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site conclusion: Instead of there being an infinite number of translations compat-
ible with all normal dispositions to speech behavior, there are often none at all. 
With that much, Quine might very nearly agree. His arguments require that 
a choice be made, but they do not dictate its outcome. In his view, one must either 
entirely abandon traditional notions of meaning, of intension, or else one must 
give up the assumption that language is, or could be, universal, that anything ex-
pressible in one language, or by using one lexicon, can be expressed also in any 
other. His own conclusion-that meaning must be abandoned-follows only be-
cause he takes universality for granted, and this paper will suggest that there is 
no sufficient basis for doing so. To possess a lexicon, a structured vocabulary, 
is to have access to the varied set of worlds which that lexicon can be used to de-
scribe. Different lexicons-those of different cultures or different historical 
periods, for example-give access to different sets of possible worlds, largely but 
never entirely overlapping. Though a lexicon may be enriched to yield access to 
worlds previously accessible only with another, the result is peculiar, a point to 
be elaborated below. In order that the "enriched" lexicon continue to serve some 
essential functions, the terms added during enrichment must be rigidly segregated 
and reserved for a special purpose. 5 
What has made the assumption of universal translatability so nearly inescap-
able is, I believe, its deceptive similarity to a quite different one, in this case an 
assumption that I share: Anything that can be said in one language can, with 
sufficient imagination and effort, be understood by a speaker of another. What 
is prerequisite to such understanding, however, is not translation but language 
learning. Quine's radical translator is, in fact, a language learner. lfhe succeeds, 
which I think no principle bars, he will become bilingual. But that does not ensure 
that he or anyone else will be able to translate from his newly acquired language 
to the one with which he was raised. Though learnability could in principle imply 
translatability, the thesis that it does so needs to be argued. Much philosophical 
discussion instead takes it for granted. Quine's Word and Object provides a nota-
bly explicit case in point. 6 
I am suggesting, in short, that the problems of translating a scientific text, 
whether into a foreign tongue or into a later version of the language in which it 
was written, are far more like those of translating literature than has generally 
been supposed. In both cases the translator repeatedly encounters sentences that 
can be rendered in several alternative ways, none of which captures them com-
pletely. Difficult decisions must then be made about which aspects of the original 
it is most important to preserve. Different translators may differ, and the same 
translator may make different choices in different places, even though the term 
involved is in neither language ambiguous. Such choices are governed by stan-
dards of responsibility, but they are not determined by them. In these matters 
there is no such thing as being merely right or wrong. The preservation of truth 
values when translating scientific prose is as delicate a task as the preservation 
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of resonance and emotional tone in the translation of literature. Neither can be 
fully achieved; even responsible approximation requires the greatest tact and 
taste. In the scientific case, these generalizations apply, not only to passages that 
make explicit use of theory, but also and more significantly to those their authors 
took to be merely descriptive. 
Unlike many people who share my generally structuralist leanings, I am not 
attempting to erase or even to reduce the gap generally thought to separate literal 
from figurative use of language. On the contrary, I cannot imagine a theory of 
figurative use-a theory, for example, of metaphor and other tropes-that did not 
presuppose a theory ofliteral meanings. Nor, to turn from theory to practice, can 
I imagine how words could be employed effectively in tropes like metaphor ex-
cept within a community whose members have previously assimilated their literal 
use. 7 My point is simply that the literal and the figurative uses of terms are alike 
in their dependence on preestablished associations between words. 
That remark provides entree to a theory of meaning, but only two aspects of 
that theory are centrally relevant to the arguments that follow, and I must here 
restrict myself to them. First, knowing what a word means is knowing how to 
use it for communication with other members of the language community within 
which it is current. But that ability does not imply that one knows something that 
attaches to the word by itself-its meaning, say, or its semantic markers. With 
occasional exceptions, words do not have meanings individually, but only 
through their associations with other words within a semantic field. If the use of 
an individual term changes, then the use of the terms associated with it normally 
changes as well. 
The second aspect of my developing view of meaning is both less standard and 
more consequential. Two people may use a set of interrelated terms in the same 
way but employ different sets (in principle, totally disjunct sets) of field coor-
dinates in doing so. Examples will be found in the next section of this paper; 
meanwhile, the following metaphor may prove suggestive. The United States can 
be mapped in many different coordinate systems. Individuals with different maps 
will specify the location of, say, Chicago by means of a different pair of coor-
dinates. But all will nevertheless locate the same city, provided that the maps are 
scaled to preserve the relative distances between the items mapped. The metric 
that accompanies each of the various sets of coordinates must, that is, be chosen 
to preserve the structural geometrical relations within the mapped area. 8 
* * 
I have so far dealt in general assertions, omitting both illustration and defense. 
The argument that begins to supply them will proceed in two stages. The first ex-
amines part of the lexicon of Newtonian mechanics, especially the interrelated 
terms 'force', 'mass', and 'weight'. It asks what one need and need not know to 
302 Thomas S. Kuhn 
be a member of the community that uses these terms, and indicates how posses-
sion of such knowledge constrains what members of the community can express. 
The second stage examines implications of these constraints for discussions of 
scientific development, especially for the application to it of causal theory. 
The vocabulary in which the phenomena of a field like mechanics are de-
scribed and explained is itself a historical product, developed over time, and 
repeatedly transmitted, in its then-current state, from one generation to its succes-
sor. In the case of Newtonian mechanics, the required cluster of terms has been 
stable for some time, and transmission techniques are relatively standard. Ex-
amining them will suggest characteristics of what the student acquires in the 
course of becoming a licensed practitioner of the field. 9 
Before the exposure to Newtonian terminology can usefully begin, other sig-
nificant portions of the lexicon must be in place. Students must, for example, al-
ready have a vocabulary adequate to refer to physical objects and to their loca-
tions in space and time. Onto this- they must have grafted a mathematical 
vocabulary rich enough to permit the quantitative description of trajectories and 
the analysis of velocities and accelerations of bodies moving along them. 10 Also, 
at least implicitly, they must command a notion of extensive magnitude, a quan-
tity whose value for the whole of a body is the sum of its values for the body's 
parts. Quantity of matter provides a standard example. These terms can all be ac-
quired without resort to Newtonian theory, and the student must control them be-
fore that theory can be learned. The other lexical items required by that theory-
most notably 'force', 'mass', and 'weight' in their Newtonian senses-can only be 
acquired together with the theory itself. 
Five aspects of the way in which these Newtonian terms are learned require 
particular illustration and emphasis. First, as already indicated, learning cannot 
begin until a considerable antecedent vocabulary is in place. Second, in the pro-
cess through which the new terms are acquired, definition plays a negligible role. 
Rather than being defined, these terms are introduced by exposure to examples 
of their use, examples provided by someone who already belongs to the speech 
community in which they are current. That exposure often includes actual ex-
hibits, for example in the student laboratory, of one or more exemplary situations 
to which the terms in question are applied by soµieone who already knows how 
to use them. The exhibits need not be actual, however. The exemplary situations 
may instead be introduced by a description conducted primarily in terms drawn 
from the antecedentally available vocabulary, but in which the terms to be learned 
also appear here and there. The two processes are for the most part interchange-
able, and most students encounter them both, in some mix or other. Both include 
an indispensable ostensive or stipulative element: terms are taught through the ex-
hibit, direct or by description, of situations to which they apply. 11 The learning 
that results from such a process is not, however, about words alone but equally 
about the world in which they function. When I use the phrase 'stipulative descrip-
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tions' in what follows, the stipulations I have in mind will be simultaneously and 
inseparably about both the substance and the vocabulary of science, about both 
the world and the language. 
A third significant aspect of the learning process is that exposure to a single 
exemplary situation seldom or never supplies enough information to permit the 
student to use a new term. Several examples of varied sorts are required, often 
accompanied by examples of apparently similar situations to which the term in 
question does not apply. The terms to be learned, furthermore, are seldom ap-
plied to these situations in isolation, but are instead embedded in whole sentences 
or statements, among which are some usually referred to as laws of nature. 
Fourth, among the statements involved in learning one previously unknown 
term are some that include other new terms as well, terms that must be acquired 
together with the first. The learning process thus interrelates a set of new terms, 
giving structure to the lexicon that contains them. Finally, though there is usually 
considerable overlap between the situations to which individual language learners 
are exposed (and even more between the accompanying statements), individuals 
can in principle communicate fully even though they acquired the terms with 
which they do so along very different routes. To the extent that the process I am 
describing supplies individuals with anything resembling a definition, it is not a 
definition that need be shared by other members of the speech community. 
For illustrations, consider first the term 'force'. The situations that exemplify 
a force's presence are of varied sorts. They include, for example, muscular exer-
tion, a stretched string or spring, a body possessed of weight (note the occurrence 
of another of the terms to be learned), or, finally, certain sorts of motion. The 
last is particularly important and presents particular difficulties to the student. As 
Newtonians use 'force', not all motions signify the presence of its referent, and 
examples that display the distinction between forced and force-free motions are 
therefore required. Their assimilation, furthermore, demands the suppression of 
a highly developed pre-Newtonian intuition. For children and Aristotelians, the 
standard example of a forced motion is the hurled projectile. Force-free motion 
is for them exemplified by the falling stone, the spinning top, or the rotating 
flywheel. For the Newtonian, all of these are cases of forced motion. The only 
example of a Newtonian force-free motion is motion in a straight line at constant 
speed, and that can be exhibited directly only in interplanetary space. Teachers 
nevertheless try. (I still remember the contrived lecture-demonstration - a block 
of ice sliding on a sheet of glass - that helped me undo prior intuitions and acquire 
the Newtonian concept of 'force'.) But for most students the main path to this key 
aspect of the use of the term is provided by Newton's first law of motion: In the 
absence of an external force applied to it, a body moves continuously at constant 
speed in a straight line. It exhibits, by description, the motions that require no 
force. 12 
More will need to be said about 'force', but let me first look briefly at its two 
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Newtonian companions, 'weight' and 'mass'. The first refers to a particular sort 
of force, the one that causes a physical body to press on its supports while at rest 
or to fall when unsupported. In this still-qualitative form the term 'weight' is avail-
able prior to Newtonian 'force' and is used during the latter's acquisition. 'Mass' 
is usually introduced as equivalent to 'quantity of matter', where matter is the sub-
strate underlying physical bodies, the stuff of which quantity is conserved as the 
qualities of material bodies change. Any feature that, like weight, picks out a 
physical body, is an index also of the presence of matter and of mass. As in the 
case of 'weight' and unlike the case of 'force', the qualitative features by which 
one picks out the referents of 'mass' are identical with those of pre-Newtonian 
usage. 
But the Newtonian use of all three terms is quantitative, and the Newtonian 
form of quantification alters both their individual uses and the interrelationships 
between them. 13 Only the unit measures may be established by convention; the 
scales must be chosen so that weight and mass are extensive quantities and so that 
forces can be added vectorially. (Contrast the case of temperature, in which both 
unit and scale can be chosen by convention.) Once again, the learning process 
requires the juxtaposition of statements involving the terms to be learned with sit-
uations drawn directly or indirectly from nature. 
Begin with the quantification of 'force'. Students acquire the full quantitative 
concept by learning to measure forces with a spring balance or some other elastic 
device. Such instruments had appeared nowhere in scientific theory or practice 
before Newton's time, when they took over the conceptual role previously played 
by the pan balance. But they have since been central, for reasons that are concep-
tual rather than pragmatic. The use of a spring balance to exhibit the proper mea-
sure of force requires, however, recourse to two statements ordinarily described 
as laws of nature. One of these is Newton's third law, which states, for example, 
that the force exerted by a weight on a spring is equal and opposite to the force 
exerted by the spring on the weight. The other is Hooke's law, which states that 
the force exerted by a stretched spring is proportional to the spring's displace-
ment. Like Newton's first law, these are first encountered during language learn-
ing, where they are juxtaposed with examples of situations to which they apply. 
Such juxtapositions play a double role, simultaneously stipulating how the word 
'force' is to be used and how the world populated by forces behaves. 
Turn now to the quantification of the terms 'mass' and 'weight'. It illustrates 
with special clarity a key aspect of the lexical acquisition process, one that has 
not yet been considered. To this point, my discussion of Newtonian terminology 
has probably suggested that, once the required antecedent vocabulary is in place, 
students learn the terms that remain by exposure to some single specifiable set 
of examples of their use. Those particular examples may well have seemed to pro-
vide necessary conditions for the acquisition of those terms. In practice, however, 
cases of that sort are very rare. Usually there are alternate sets of examples that 
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will serve for the acquisition of the same term or terms. And, though it usually 
makes no difference to which set of these examples an individual has, in fact, been 
exposed, there are special circumstances in which the differences between sets 
prove very important. 
In the case of 'mass' and 'weight', one of these alternate sets is standard. It is 
able to supply the missing elements of both vocabulary and theory together, and 
it probably therefore enters the lexical acquisition process for all students. But 
logically other examples would have done as well, and for most students some 
of them also play a role. Begin with the standard route, which first quantifies 
'mass' in the guise of what today is called 'inertial mass'. Students are presented 
with Newton's second law-force equals mass times acceleration-as a descrip-
tion of the way moving bodies actually behave; but the description makes essen-
tial use of the still incompletely established term 'mass'. That term and the second 
law are thus acquired together, and the law can thereafter be used to supply the 
missing measure: the mass of a body is proportional to its acceleration under the 
influence of a known force. For purposes of concept acquisition, centripetal-force 
apparatus provides a particularly effective way to make the measurement. 
Once mass and the second law have been added to the Newtonian lexicon in 
this way, the law of gravity can be introduced as an empirical regularity. N ewto-
nian theory is applied to observation of the heavens and the attractions manifest 
there are compared to those between the Earth and bodies resting on it. The 
mutual attraction between bodies is thus shown to be proportional to the product 
of their masses, an empirical regularity that can be used to introduce the still miss-
ing aspects of the Newtonian term 'weight'. 'Weight' is now seen to denote a rela-
tional property, one that depends on the presence of two or more bodies. It can 
therefore, unlike mass, differ from one location to another, at the surface of the 
Earth and of the Moon, for example. That difference is captured only by the 
spring balance, not by the previously standard pan balance, which yields the same 
reading at all locations. What the pan balance measures is mass, a quantity that 
depends only on the body and on the choice of a unit measure. 
Because it establishes both the second law and the use of 'mass', the sequence 
just sketched provides the most direct route to many applications of Newtonian 
theory. 14 That is why it plays so central a role in introducing the theory's vocabu-
lary. But it is not, as previously indicated, required for that purpose, and, in any 
case, it rarely functions alone. Let me now consider a second route along which 
the use of 'mass' and 'weight' can be established. It starts from the same point as 
the first, by quantifying the notion of force with the aid of a spring balance. Next, 
'mass' is introduced in the guise of what is today labeled 'gravitational mass'. A 
stipulative description of the way the world is provides students with the notion 
of gravity as a universal force of attraction between pairs of material bodies, its 
magnitude proportional to the mass of each. With the missing aspects of 'mass' 
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thus supplied, weight can be explained as a relational property, the force resulting 
from gravitational attraction. 
That is a second way to establish the use of the Newtonian terms 'mass' and 
'weight'. With them in hand Newton's second law, the still missing component 
of Newtonian theory, can be introduced as empirical, a consequence simply of 
observation. For that purpose, centripetal force apparatus is again appropriate, 
no longer to measure mass, as it did on the first route, but now rather to determine 
the relation between applied force and the acceleration of a mass previously mea-
sured by gravitational means. The two routes thus differ in what must be stipu-
lated about nature in order to learn Newtonian terms, what can be left instead for 
empirical discovery. On the first route, the second law enters stipulatively, the 
law of gravitation empirically. On the second, their epistemic status is reversed. 
In each case one, but only one, of the laws is, so to speak, built into the lexicon. 
I do not quite want to call such laws analytic, for experience with nature was es-
sential to their initial formulation. Yet they do have something of the necessity 
that the label 'analytic' implies. Perhaps 'synthetic a priori' comes closer. 
There are, of course, still other ways in which the quantitative elements of 
'mass' and 'weight' can be acquired. For example, Hooke's law having been in-
troduced together with 'force', the spring balance can be stipulated as the measure 
of weight, and mass can be measured, again by stipulation, in terms of the vibra-
tion period of a weight at the end of a spring. In practice, several of these applica-
tions of Newtonian theory usually enter into the process of acquiring Newtonian 
language, information about the lexicon, and information about the world being 
distributed in an indivisible mix among them. Under those circumstances, one or 
another of the examples introduced during lexical acquisition can, when occasion 
requires, be adjusted or replaced in the light ofnew observations. Other examples 
will maintain the lexicon stable, keeping in place a set of quasi necessities equiva-
lent to those initially induced by language learning. 
Clearly, however, only a certain number of examples may be altered piece-
meal in this way. If too many require adjustment, then it is no longer individual 
laws or generalizations that are at stake, but the very vocabulary in which they 
are stated. A threat to that vocabulary is, however, a threat also to the theory or 
laws essential to its acquisition and use. Could Newtonian mechanics withstand 
revision of the second law, of the third law, of Hooke's law, or the law of gravity? 
Could it withstand the revision of any two of these, of three, or of all four? These 
are not questions that individually have yes or no answers. Rather, like Wittgen-
stein's "Could one play chess without the queen?", they suggest the strains placed 
on a lexicon confronted by questions that its designer, whether God or cognitive 
evolution, did not anticipate its being required to answer. 15 What should one have 
said when confronted by an egg-laying creature that suckles its young? Is it a 
mammal or is it not? These are the circumstances in which, as Austin put it, "We 
don't know what to say. Words literally fail us."16 Such circumstances, if they en-
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dure for long, call forth a locally different lexicon, one that permits an answer, 
but to a slightly altered question: "Yes, the creature is a mammal" (but to be a 
mammal is not what it was before). The new lexicon opens new possibilities, ones 
that could not have been stipulated by the use of the old. 
To clarify what I have in mind, let me suppose that there are only two ways 
in which use of the terms 'mass' and 'weight' can be acquired: one that stipulates 
the second law and finds the law of gravity empirically; another that stipulates 
the law of gravity and discovers the second law empirically. Suppose further that 
the two routes are exclusive; students traverse one or the other so that the necessi-
ties of the lexicon and the contingencies of experiment are kept separate on each. 
Clearly, these two routes are very Qifferent, but the differences will not ordinarily 
interfere with full communication among those who use the terms. All will pick 
out the same objects and situations as the referents of the terms they share, and 
all will agree about the laws and other generalizations governing these objects and 
situations. All are thus fully participants in a single speech community. What in-
dividual speakers may differ about is the epistemic status of generalizations that 
community members share, and such differences are not usually important. In-
deed, in ordinary scientific discourse, they do not emerge at all. While the world 
behaves in anticipated ways-the ones for which the lexicon evolved-these 
differences between individual speakers are of little or no consequence. 
But change of circumstance may make such differences consequential. Im-
agine that a discrepancy is discovered between Newtonian theory and observa-
tion, for example celestial observations of the motion of the lunar perigee. Scien-
tists who had learned Newtonian 'mass' and 'weight' along the first of my two 
lexical-acquisition routes would be free to consider altering the law of gravity as 
a way to remove the anomaly. On the other hand, they would be bound by lan-
guage to preserve the second law. On the other hand, scientists who had acquired 
'mass' and 'weight' along my second route would be free to suggest altering the 
second law but would be bound by language to preserve the law of gravity. A 
difference in the language-learning route, one that had had no effect while the 
world behaved as anticipated, would become the source of a difference of opinion 
when anomalies were found. 
Now suppose that neither the revisions that preserved the second law nor those 
that preserved the law of gravity proved effective in eliminating anomaly. The 
next step would be an attempt at revisions that altered both laws together, and 
those revisions the lexicon will not, in its present form, permit. 17 Such attempts 
are often successful nonetheless, but they require recourse to such devices as 
metaphorical extension, devices that alter the meanings of lexical items them-
selves. After such revision, say the transition to an Einsteinian vocabulary, one 
can write down strings of symbols that look like revised versions of the second 
law and the law of gravity. But the resemblance is deceptive, because some sym-
bols in the new strings attach to nature differently from the corresponding sym-
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bols in the old, thus distinguishing between situations which, in the antecedently 
available vocabulary, were the same. 18 They are the symbols for terms whose ac-
quisition involved laws that have changed form with the change of theory: the 
differences between the old laws and the new are reflected by the terms acquired 
with them. Each of the resulting lexicons then gives access to its own set of pos-
sible worlds, and the two sets are disjoint. Translations involving terms in-
troduced with the altered laws are impossible. 
The impossibility of translation does not, of course, bar users of one lexicon 
from learning the other. And having done so, they can join the two together, en-
riching their initial lexicon by adding to it sets of terms from the new one they 
have acquired. That is, as I have argued elsewhere, what historians do both for 
themselves and for their readers. 19 But the sense of enrichment involved is pecu-
liar. It is like the enrichment that gives philosophers an alternative set of terms 
for describing emeralds: not 'blue', 'green', and the traditional roster of color 
terms, but 'grue', 'bleen', and the names of the other occupants of the correspond-
ing spectrum. 20 One set of terms is projectible, supports induction, the other not. 
One set of terms is available for descriptions of the world, the other is reserved 
for the special purposes of the philosopher, the historian, the writer of certain 
sorts of fiction. However useful these lexical add-ons may be, the integrity oflan-
guage requires that they be segregated, reserved for distinct sorts of discourse. 
If communication is to succeed, then all participants in discourse must know at 
all times which set of terms is being used. 
Students of literature have long taken for granted that metaphor and its com-
panion devices (those that alter the interrelations among words) provide entree 
to new worlds and make translation impossible by doing so. Similar characteris-
tics have been widely attributed to the language of political life and, by some, to 
the entire range of the human sciences. But the natural sciences, dealing objec-
tively with the real world (as they do), are generally held to be immune. Their 
truths (and falsities) are thought to transcend the ravages of temporal, cultural, 
and linguistic change. I am suggesting, of course, that they cannot do so. Neither 
the descriptive nor the theoretical language of a natural science provides the bed-
rock such transcendence would require. I shall not in this paper even attempt to 
deal with the philosophical problems consequent upon that point of view. 21 
Rather, I shall attempt to reinforce them by examining a technique that claims to 
set them aside. 
* * * 
Change of lexicon, I have been arguing, can change the meaning of some 
group or groups of interrelated terms. Problems about the possibility of truth-
preserving translations result, and efforts to avoid them have in recent years taken 
a characteristic form. Truth values, these efforts emphasize, depend only on 
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reference, not on meaning or mode of use. Discussions of truth value need not, 
therefore, invoke meaning at all, at least not in a sense so nearly traditional as 
the one I appear to have invoked here. 22 
Among such efforts, the most influential is the causal theory of reference, and 
many of the advances achieved with its aid are likely to prove permanent. But 
causal theory, which invokes an original act of baptism or dubbing as an essential 
determinant of reference, is intrinsically historical, and its expositors resort 
repeatedly to putative examples from scientific development. These examples, I 
believe, quite regularly fail in ways that are both consequential and illuminating. 
To see what is involved, I conclude this paper by examining two well-known ex-
amples developed by Hilary Putnam, the philosopher who has most explicitly ap-
plied causal theory to history. 23 
Excluding proper names, I doubt that there is any set of terms for which causal 
theory works precisely; but it comes very close to doing so for terms like 'gold', 
and the plausibility of its application to natural-kind terms depends on the exis-
tence of such cases. Terms that behave like 'gold' ordinarily refer to naturally oc-
curring, widely distributed, functionally significant, and easily recognized sub-
stances. Such terms occur in the languages of most or all cultures, retain their 
original use over time, and refer throughout to the same sorts of samples. There 
is little problem about translating them, for they occupy closely equivalent posi-
tions in all lexicons. 'Gold' is among the closest approximations we have to an 
item in a neutral, mind-independent observation vocabulary. 
When a term is of this sort, modern science can often be used not only to 
specify the common essence of its referents but actually to single them out. Mod-
ern theory, for example, identifies gold as the substance with atomic number 79, 
and licenses specialists to identify it by the application of such techniques as x-ray 
spectroscopy. Neither the theory nor the instrument was available seventy-five 
years ago, but it is nevertheless reasonable to suggest, as Putnam does, that the 
referents of'gold' are and have always been the same as the referents of'substance 
with atomic number 79'. Exceptions to that equation are few, and they result 
primarily from the ever-increasing refinement of our ability to detect impurities 
and forgeries. For the causal theorist, therefore, 'having atomic number 79', is 
the essential property of gold- the single property such that, if gold in fact does 
have it, then it has it necessarily. Other properties -yellowness and ductility, for 
example-are superficial and correspondingly contingent. Kripke suggests that 
gold might even be blue, its apparent yellowness resulting from an optical illu-
sion. 24 Though individuals may, in fact, use color and other superficial character-
istics when picking out samples of gold, that practice tells nothing essential about 
the referents of the term. 
'Gold' presents a relatively special case, however, and what is special about 
it obscures essential limitations on the conclusions it will support. More represen-
tative is Putnam's most developed example, 'water', and the problems that arise 
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with it are still more severe in the case of such other widely discussed terms as 
'heat' and 'electricity'. 25 For water the discussion divides in two parts. In the first, 
which is the more familiar, Putnam imagines a possible world containing Twin 
Earth, a planet just like our own except that the stuff called 'water' by Twin Earth-
ians is not H20 but a different liquid with a very long and complicated chemical 
formula abbreviated XYZ. "Indistinguishable from water at normal temperature 
and pressure," XYZ is the stuff that on Twin Earth quenches thirst, rains from 
the skies, and fills oceans and lakes, much as water does here. If a spaceship from 
Earth ever visits Twin Earth, Putnam writes: 
then, the supposition at first will be that 'water' has the same meaning on Earth 
and Twin Earth. This supposition will be corrected when it is discovered that 
'water' on Twin Earth is XYZ, and the Earthian spaceship will report some-
what as follows: "On Twin Earth the word 'water' means XYZ." (Seen. 23.) 
As in the case of gold, superficial qualities like quenching thirst or raining from 
the skies have no role in determining to what substance the term 'water' properly 
refers. 
Two aspects of Putnam's fable require special notice. First, the fact that Twin 
Earthians call XYZ by the name 'water' (the same symbol that Earthians use for 
the stuff that lies in lakes, quenches thirst, etc.) is an irrelevancy. The difficulties 
presented by this story will emerge more clearly if the visitors from Earth use 
their own language throughout. Second, and presently central, whatever the visi-
tors call the stuff that lies in Twin Earthian lakes, the report they send home 
should not be about language but about chemistry. It must take some form like: 
"Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical theory." 
The terms 'XYZ' and 'H20' are drawn from modern chemical theory, and that 
theory is incompatible with the existence of a substance with properties very 
nearly the same as water but described by an elaborate chemical formula. Such 
a substance would, among other things, be too heavy to evaporate at normal ter-
restrial temperatures. Its discovery would present the same problems as the 
simultaneous violation of Newton's second law and the law of gravity described 
in the last section. It would, that is, demonstrate the presence of fundamental er-
rors in the chemical theory that gives meanings to compound names like 'H20' 
and the unabbreviated form of 'XYZ'. Within the lexicon of modern chemistry, 
a world containing both our Earth and Putnam's Twin Earth is lexically possible, 
but the composite statement that describes it is necessarily false. Only with a 
differently structured lexicon, one shaped to describe a very different sort of 
world, could one, without contradiction, describe the behavior of 'XYZ' at all, 
and in that lexicon 'H20' might no longer refer to what we call 'water'. 
So much for the first part of Putnam's argument. In the second he applies it 
more concretely to the referential history of 'water', suggesting that "we roll the 
time back to 1750," and continuing: 
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At that time chemistry was not developed on either Earth or Twin Earth. The 
typical Earthian speaker of English did not know water consisted of hydrogen 
and oxygen, and the typical Twin Earthian speaker of English did not know 
'water' consisted of XYZ. . . . Yet the extension of the term 'water' was just 
as much H20 on Earth in 1750 as in 1950; and the extension of the term 'water' 
was just as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 as in 1950. (Seen. 23.) 
In journeys through time, as in those through space, Putnam suggests, it is chemi-
cal formula, not superficial qualities, that determines whether a given substance 
is water. 
For present purposes, attention can be restricted to Earthian history, and on 
Earth Putnam's argument for 'water' is the same as it was for 'gold'. The extension 
of 'water' is determined by the original sample together with the relation 
sameness-of-kind. That sample dates from before 1750, and the nature of its 
members has been stable. So has the relation sameness-of-kind, though explana-
tions of what it is for two bodies to be of the same kind have varied widely. What 
matters, however, is not explanations but what gets picked out, and identifying 
samples ofH20 is, according to causal theory, the best means yet found to pick 
out samples of the same kind as the original set. Give-or-take a few discrepancies 
at the margins, discrepancies due to refinement of technique or perhaps to change 
of interest, 'H20' refers to the same samples that 'water' referred to in either 1750 
or 1950. Apparently causal theory has rendered the referents of 'water' immune 
to changes in the concept of water, the theory of water, and the way samples of 
water are picked out. The parallel between causal theory's treatment of 'gold' and 
of 'water' seems complete. 
But in the case of water, difficulties arise. 'H20' picks out samples not only 
of water but also of ice and steam. H20 can exist in all three states of 
aggregation-solid, liquid, and gaseous-and it is therefore not the same as wa-
ter, at least not as picked out by the term 'water' in 17 50. The difference in items 
referred to is, furthermore, by no means marginal, like that due to impurities for 
example. Whole categories of substance are involved, and their involvement is 
by no means accidental. In 1750 the primary differences between the species 
recognized by chemists were still more or less those between what are now called 
the states of aggregation. Water, in particular, was an elementary body of which 
liquidity was an essential property. For some chemists the term 'water' referred 
to the generic liquid, and it had done so for many more only a few generations 
before. Not until the 1780s, in an episode long known as the "Chemical Revolu-
tion," was the taxonomy of chemistry transformed so that a chemical species 
might exist in all three states of aggregation. Thereafter, the distinction between 
solids, liquids, and gases became physical, not chemical. The discovery that liq-
uid water was a compound of two gaseous substances, hydrogen and oxygen, was 
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an integral part of that larger transformation and could not have been made with-
out it. 
This is not to suggest that modern science is incapable of picking out the stuff 
that people in 1750 (and most people still) label 'water'. That term refers to liquid 
H20. It should be described not simply as H20 but as close-packed H20 particles 
in rapid relative motion. Marginal differences again aside, samples answering 
that compound description are the ones picked out in 1750 and before by the term 
'water'. But this modern description leads to a new network of difficulties, 
difficulties that may ultimately threaten the concept of natural kinds and that 
meanwhile must bar the automatic application of causal theory to them. 
Causal theory was initially developed with notable success for application to 
proper names. Its transfer from them to natural-kind terms was facilitated-
perhaps made possible- by the fact that natural kinds, like single individual crea-
tures, are denqted by short and apparently arbitrary names, names coextensive 
with those of the corresponding kind's single essential property. Our examples 
have been 'gold' paired with 'having atomic number 79', and 'water' paired with 
'being H20'. The latter member of each pair names a property, of course, as the 
name coupled with it does not. But so long as only a single essential property is 
required by each natural kind that difference is inconsequential. When two non-
coextensive names are required, however-'H20' and 'liquidity' in the case of 
water-then each name, if used alone, picks out a larger class than the pair does 
when conjoined, and the fact that they name properties becomes central. For if 
two properties are required, why not three or four? Are we not back to the stan-
dard set of problems that casual theory was intended to resolve: which properties 
are essential, which accidental; which properties belong to a kind by definition, 
which are only contingent? Has the transition to a developed scientific vocabulary 
really helped at all? 
I think it has not. The lexicon required to label attributes like being-H20 or 
being-close-packed-particles-in-rapid-relative-motion is rich and systematic. No 
one can use any of the terms that it contains without being able to use a great 
many. And given that vocabulary, the problems of choosing essential properties 
arise again, except that the properties involved can no longer be dismissed as su-
perficial. Is deuterium hydrogen, for example, and is heavy water really water? 
And what may one say about a sample of close-packed particles of H20 in rapid 
relative motion at the critical point- under the conditions of temperature and 
pressure, that is, at which the liquid, solid, and gaseous states are indistinguish-
able? Is it really water? The use of theoretical rather than superficial properties 
offers great advantages, of course. There are fewer of the former; the relations 
between them are more systematic; and they permit both richer and more precise 
discriminations. But they come no closer to being essential or necessary proper-
ties than the superficial ones they appear to supplant. 
The inverse argument proves even more significant. The so-called superficial 
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properties are no less necessary than their apparently essential successors. To say 
that water is liquid H20 is to locate it within an elaborate lexical and theoretical 
system. Given that system, as one must be in order to use the label, one can in 
principle predict the superficial properties of water Gust as one could those of 
XYZ), compute its boiling and freezing points, the optical wavelengths that it will 
transmit, and so on. 26 If water is liquid H20, then these properties are necessary 
to it. If they were not realized in practice, that would be a reason to doubt that 
water really was H20. 
This. last argument applies also to the case of gold, in which causal theory ap-
parently succeeded. 'Atomic number' is a term from the lexicon of atomic-
molecular theory. Like 'force' and 'mass', it must be learned together with other 
terms deployed in that theory, and the theory itself must play a role in the acquisi-
tion process. When the process is complete, one can replace the label 'gold' with 
'atomic number 79', but one can then also replace the label 'hydrogen' with 'atomic 
number 1', 'oxygen' with 'atomic number 8', and so on to a total well over a hun-
dred. And one can do something more important as well. Invoking such other the-
oretical properties as electronic charge and mass, one can in principle, and to a 
considerable extent in fact, predict the superficial qualities - density, color, duc-
tility, conductivity, and so on - that samples of the corresponding substance will 
possess at normal temperatures. Those properties are no more accidental than 
having-atomic-number-79. That color is a superficial property does not make it 
a contingent one. Furthermore, in a comparison of superficial and theoretical 
qualities, the former have a double priority. If the theory that posits the relevant 
theoretical properties could not predict these superficial qualities or some of 
them, there would be no reason to take it seriously. If gold were blue for a normal 
observer under normal conditions of illumination, its atomic number would not 
be 79. In addition, superficial properties are the ones called upon in those difficult 
cases of discrimination characteristically raised by new theories. Is deuterium 
really hydrogen, for example? Are viruses alive?27 
What remains special about 'gold' is simply that, unlike 'water', only one of 
the underlying properties recognized by modern science-having atomic number 
79-need be called upon to pick out members of the sample to which the term 
has continued through history to refer. 28 'Gold' is not the only term that possesses 
or closely approximates this characteristic. So do many of the basic-level refer-
ring terms used in everyday speech, including the everyday use of the term 'wa-
ter'. But not all everyday terms are of this sort. 'Planet' and 'star' now categorize 
the world of celestial objects differently from the way they did before Copernicus, 
and the differences are not well described by phrases like "marginal adjustment" 
or "zeroing in." Similar transitions have characterized the historical development 
of virtually all the referring terms of the sciences, including the most elementary: 
'force', 'species', 'heat', 'element', 'temperature', and so on. It is terms like these 
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that have provided this paper's primary concern, and a three-item summary of 
what it has had to say about them can now bring it quickly to a close. 
Dealing with such Newtonian terms as 'mass', 'force', and 'weight', the second 
section of this paper emphasized that they are learned in use. The student first en-
counters them in authoritative statements about the world by someone who al-
ready knows how to use them and who illustrates their correct use by juxtaposing 
statements that contain them with exemplary situations to which those statements 
do or do not apply. Two parallels to that position are implicit in the third section's 
discussion of causal theory. First, the role played by actual examples in anchoring 
terms of the lexicon to the world recurs in causal theory's emphasis on an original 
act of dubbing, which supplies examples canonical for later use. Second, the em-
phasis on language learning - on the way the lexicon is transmitted from one 
generation to the next-is duplicated in causal theory's emphasis upon the chain 
linking later users of a term to the canonical sample. These are important 
parallels, especially because their recognition makes it possible to isolate the key 
respect in which the position taken in this paper diverges from that of causal the-
ory. Dubbing is here seen as a process that recurs again and again through his-
tory. The putative "original sample" may mark the beginning of the chain, if any 
beginning is needed, but there is nothing privileged about its membership. The 
sets of canonical examples used in transmitting the lexicon change in the course 
of time, and not all the changes can properly be viewed as mere adjustments. 
Many of them, of course, are small adjustments, for example those due to 
refinements in the process of purifying gold. But others are both systematic and 
wide reaching. Changes in the sample required to transmit a term like 'force' can-
not be made in isolation, but require simultaneous changes in the samples used 
to introduce such terms as 'mass' and 'weight'. Moving circular motions from the 
category of force-free to that of forced motions required shifting uniform linear 
motions from forced to force-free. Simultaneously, the exhibit of a new instru-
ment, the spring balance, was required to introduce the Newtonian term 'force', 
and examples that introduced the corresponding term 'weight' were required to 
exhibit not simply the body whose weight was in question, but one or more other 
bodies in gravitational interaction with it. Similarly, the development of the 
chemical lexicon in which H20 is embedded required an almost total readjust-
ment in the samples used to introduce the basic chemical kinds. No workable 
form of chemistry could have survived the change that placed liquid water in the 
same category as ice and steam but continued elsewhere to regard the divisions 
between states of aggregation as chemically fundamental. In short, dubbing and 
the procedures that accompany it ordinarily do more than place the dubbed object 
together with other members of its kind. They also locate it with respect to other 
kinds, placing it not simply within a taxonomic category but within a taxonomic 
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system. Only while that system endures do the names of the kinds it categorizes 
designate rigidly. 
A lexicon that embodies such interrelationships between terms necessarily also 
embodies knowledge of the world those terms can be used to describe, and that 
knowledge may be placed at risk. As time goes on and new demands are placed 
on the lexicon, conditions may be encountered that defy description. The Newto-
nian lexicon could not, without internal contradiction, describe a world in which 
both Newton's second law and the law of gravity were violated. Prior to the eigh-
teenth century, the lexicon of chemistry could not provide a coherent description 
of a world in which a sample of liquid could change its state of aggregation with-
out simultaneously changing its chemical kind. But these changes, both in 
mechanics and in chemistry, nevertheless came about, together with the change 
of lexicon they required. And the new lexicon, once consolidated, displayed the 
same sorts of limitations as its predecessor. It could not, that is, be used to to pro-
vide coherent descriptions of some aspects of the world described by its predeces-
sor. Here and there the old and new lexicons embodied differently structured, 
nonhomologous taxonomies, and statements involving terms from the regions 
where the two differed were not translatable between them. 
Those untranslatable statements are the ones from which this paper began, the 
ones that make no sense to the historian who encounters them in an out-of-date 
text, and which lead him or her to abandon translation in favor of language learn-
ing. Returning to them closes a circle. Though well aware that challenging prob-
lems are located within it, I shall not start another lap here and now. 
Notes 
1. Throughout this paper I shall continue to speak of the lexicon, of terms, and of statements. 
My concern, however, is actually with conceptual or intensional categories more generally, e.g., with 
those that may reasonably be attributed to animals or to the perceptual system. 
2. For Newton, see my "Newton's '31st Query' and the Degradation of Gold," Isis 42 (1951), 
296-98. For Bohr, see John L. Heilbron and Thomas S. Kuhn, "The Genesis of the Bohr Atom," 
Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 1 (1969), 211-90, where the nonsense passages that gave 
rise to the project are quoted on p. 271. For an introduction to the other examples mentioned, see 
my "What are Scientific Revolutions?" in L. J. Daston, M. Heidelberger, and L. Kruger, eds., The 
Probabilistic Revolution, vol. l, Ideas in History (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 7-22. 
3. For a fuller and more nuanced discussion of this point and those that follow see my "Commen-
surability, Comparability, Communicability," in P. D. Asquith and T. Nickles, eds., PSA 1982, vol. 
2 (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1983), 669-88. 
4. My original discussion described nonlinguistic as well as linguistic forms of incommensura-
bility. That I now take to have been an overextension resulting from my failure to recognize how large 
a part of the apparently nonlinguistic component was acquired with language during the learning pro-
cess. The acquisition during language learning of what I once took to be incommensurability with 
respect to instrumentation is, for example, illustrated by the discussion of the spring balance in the 
next section of this paper. 
5. To speak of different lexicons as giving access to different sets of possible worlds is not simply 
to add one more kind of accessibility relation to those that currently generate different kinds of modal 
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necessity. There is no type of necessity corresponding to lexical accessibility. Excepting purely ana-
lytic statements or combinations of statements, for which see below, no statement framable in a given 
lexicon is necessary simply because it can be accessed in that lexicon. More generally, lexical accessi-
bility seems to cut across the standard set of accessibility relations. Perhaps all possible-world anal-
yses of modalities and semantics should be relativized to the lexicons with which the appropriate set 
of possible worlds might have been stipulated or described. 
6. W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object (New York: John Wiley & Sons; Cambridge: MIT Press; 
1960), 47, 70f. 
7. See my "Metaphor in Science," in Andrew Ortony, ed., Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 409-19. 
8. Some preliminary indications of what these cryptic remarks intend are supplied in my "Com-
mensurability, Comparability, Communicability" (See note 3 above). 
9. I discuss the transmission of a lexicon because it is a source of clues to what the individual's 
possession of a lexicon entails. Nothing, however, depends upon the lexicon's being acquired by 
transmission. The consequences would be the same if, for example, it were a consequence of genetics 
or else implanted by a skilled neurosurgeon. I shall, for example, shortly emphasize that transmitting 
a lexicon requires repeated recourse to concrete examples. Implanting the same lexicon surgically 
would, I am suggesting, have involved implanting the memory traces left by exposure to such ex-
amples. 
10. In practice, the techniques for describing velocities and accelerations along trajectories are 
usually learned in the same courses that introduce the terms to which I turn next. But the first set can 
be acquired without the second, whereas the second cannot be acquired without the first. 
11. The terms "ostension" and "ostensive" have two different uses, which for present purposes 
need to be distinguished. In one, these terms imply that nothing but the exhibit of a word's referent 
is needed to learn or to define it. In the other, they imply only that some exhibit is required during 
the acquisition process. I shall, of course, be using the second sense of the terms. The propriety of 
extending them to cases in which description in an antecedent vocabulary replaces an actual exhibit 
depends on recognizing that description does not supply a string of words equivalent to the statements 
containing the words to be learned. Rather it enables students to visualize the situation and apply to 
the visualization the same mental processes (whatever they may be) that would otherwise have been 
applied to the situation as perceived. 
12. Newton's first law is a logical consequence of his second, and Newton's reason for stating them 
separately has long been a puzzle. The answer may well lie in pedagogic strategy. If Newton had per-
mitted the second law to subsume the first, his readers would have had to sort out his use of 'force' 
and of'mass' together, an intrinsically difficult task further complicated by the fact that the terms had 
previously been different not only in their individual use but in their interrelation. Separating them 
to the extent possible displayed the nature of the required changes more clearly. 
13. Though my analysis diverges from theirs, many of the considerations that follow (as well as 
a few of those introduced above) were suggested by contemplation of the techniques developed by 
J. D. Sneed and Wolfgang Stegmiiller for formalizing physical theories, especially by their manner 
of introducing theoretical terms. Note also that these remarks suggest a route to the solution of a cen-
tral problem of their approach, how to distinguish the core of a theory from its expansions. For this 
problem see my paper, "Theory Change as Structure Change: Comments on the Sneed Formalism," 
Erkenntnis, 10 (1976), 179-99. 
14. All applications of Newtonian theory depend on understanding 'mass', but for many of them 
'weight' is dispensable. 
15. Twenty-five years ago the quotation was a standard part of what I now discover was a merely 
oral tradition. Though clearly "Wittgensteinian," it is not to be found in any of Wittgenstein's pub-
lished writings. I preserve it here because of its recurrent role in my own philosophical development 
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and because fve found no published substitute that so clearly prohibits the response that the question 
might be answerable if only there were more information. 
16. J. L. Austin, "Other Minds," in Collected Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), 44-84. The quoted passage occurs on p. 56, and the italics are Austin's. For examples 
from literature of situations in which words fail us, see James Boyd White, When Words Lose their 
Meaning, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). I have compared an example from the 
sciences witih one from developmental psychology in "A Function for Thought Experiments," 
reprinted in The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 240-65. 
17. At this point I will seem to be reintroducing the previously banished notion of analyticity, and 
perhaps I am. Using the Newtonian lexicon, the statement "Newton's second Jaw and the law of 
gravity are both false" is itself false. Furthermore, it is false by virtue of the meanings of the Newto-
nian terms 'force' and 'mass'. But it is not-unlike the statement "Some bachelors are married"-false 
by virtue of the definitions of those terms. The meanings of 'force' and 'mass' are not embodiable in 
definitions, but rather in their relation to the world. The necessity to which I here appeal is not so 
much analytic as synthetic a priori. 
18. In fact, for the Newton-to-Einstein transition, the most significant lexical change is in the an-
tecedent kinematic vocabulary for space and time, and it moves from there upward into the vocabulary 
of mechanics. 
19. See the reference cited in note 3 . 
20. Like the Newtonian terms I have been examining, the terms in any color vocabulary form an 
interrelated set. One cannot alter one of them without making corresponding alterations in a number 
of the others as well. Note, however, that the parallel I am drawing is incomplete. Because their differ-
ences do not affect the structure of the color vocabulary itself, one can translate between the project-
able 'blue'/'green' vocabulary and the unprojectable vocabulary containing 'bleen'/'grue'. 
21. Despite my critics, I do not think that the position developed here leads to relativism, but the 
threats to realism are real and require much discussion, which I expect to provide in another place. 
These problems have already emerged repeatedly in this paper: in transitions between object language 
and metalanguage, for example, or in constant substitution of talk about how the world used to be, 
for talk about how people thought it was. They will emerge again below in my implied refusal to sup-
pose, with Putnam, that the need to make drastic changes in the set of objects to which a term once 
referred indicates that it did not, in fact, refer at all. 
22. Views that, like mine, depend on talking about the way words are actually used, the situations 
in which they apply, are regularly charged with invoking a "verification theory of meaning," not cur-
rently a respectable thing to do. But in my case at least that charge does not hold. Verification theories 
attribute meanings to individual sentences and through them to the individual terms those sentences 
contain. Each term has a meaning determined by the way in which sentences containing it are verified. 
I have been suggesting, however, that with occasional exceptions terms do not individually have 
meanings at all. More important, the view sketched above insists that people may use the same lexi-
con, refer to the same items with it, and yet pick out those items in different ways. Reference is a 
function of the shared structure of the lexicon, but not of the varied feature spaces within which in-
dividuals represent that structure. There is, however, a second charge, closely related to verifica-
tionism, of which I am guilty. Those who maintain the independence of reference and meaning also 
maintain that metaphysics is independent of epistemology. No view like mine (in the respects 
presently at issue there are a number) is compatible with so stringent a separation. The distinction 
between metaphysics and epistemology can be drawn only from within a position that involves both. 
23. "The Meaning of Meaning," in Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1975), 215-71, especially 223ff. All the quotations that follow are from the latter pages. 
Putnam has, I believe, now abandoned significant components of the essentialist viewpoint that under-
lies this paper, moving from it to a view ("internal realism") with significant parallels to my own. But 
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few philosophers have followed him: both the examples and the viewpoint discussed below are still 
very much alive. 
24. Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 118. 
25. The force of Putnam's discussion depends in part upon an equivocation that needs to be elimi-
nated. As used in everyday life or by the laity, 'water' has through history behaved much like 'gold'. 
But that is not the case within the community of scientists and philosophers to which Putnam's argu-
ment needs to be applied. 
26. Laypeople can, of course, say that water is H20 without controlling the fuller lexicon or the 
theory that it supports. But their ability to communicate by doing so depends upon the presence of 
experts in their society. The laity must be able to identify the experts and say something of the nature 
of the relevant expertise. And the experts must, in turn, command the lexicon, the theory, and the 
computations. 
27. At issue, of course, is where to draw the boundary lines that delimit the referents of 'water', 
'living thing', and so on, a problem that arises from and seems to threaten the notion of natural kinds. 
That notion is closely modeled on the concept of a biological species, and discussions of causal theory 
repeatedly invoke the relation between a particular gene type and a corresponding species (often 
tigers) to illustrate the relation said to hold between a natural kind and its essence between H20 and 
water, for example, or between atomic number 79 and gold. But even individuals who are unproble-
matically members of the same species have differently constituted sets of genes. Which sets are com-
patible with membership in that species is a subject of continuing debate, both in principle and prac-
tice, and the subject of the argument is always which superficial propenies (e.g., the ability to 
interbreed) the members of a species must share. 
28. Even for gold this generalization is not altogether correct. As mentioned above, scientific pro-
gress does result in marginal adjustments of the original samples of gold by virtue of "our increased· 
ability to detect impurities" (see n. 23). But what it is for gold to be pure is determined in part by 
theory. If gold is the substance with atomic number 79, then even a single atom with a different atomic 
number constitutes an impurity. But if gold is, as it was in antiquity, a metal that ripens naturally in 
the earth, changing gradually from lead through iron and silver to gold in the process, then there is 
no single form of matter that is gold tout court. When the ancients applied the term "gold" to samples 
from which we might withhold it, they were not always simply mistaken. 
